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1. Overview   
There is increasing recognition that the illegal wildlife trade (IWT)
1
 involves wide and complex 
networks, engages a diverse range of actors, and has far-reaching political and economic 
effects. It encompasses poachers, armed non-state actors from source nations, international 
crime groups and legitimate (albeit often corrupt) authorities. However, few studies explicitly use 
political economy analysis (PEA)
2
 to analyse IWT and the criminal networks involved, and there 
is only a limited number of case studies in the literature that explore the underlying drivers, 
networks and power relations involved.  
IWT has grown to become a massive global industry. Various organisations and reports estimate 
that the trade is worth at least US$19 billion per year and rank IWT as the fourth largest global 
illegal activity (IFAW 2013). The emerging picture of IWT is that organised criminal syndicates 
provide the trafficking routes and methods to join together source countries with increasingly 
wealthy end-user markets, primarily in Asia. As with other forms of transnational crime, those 
involved use corrupt officials and politicians to evade enforcement and control mechanisms and 
to protect the illegal chains of custody.  
This review is based on a rapid assessment of academic, donor and grey literature. A large part 
of recent scholarship in this area has been produced by international non-governmental 
organisations (INGOs), or else can be found in peer-reviewed academic journals. Authors do not 
appear to have engaged with the gender implications of IWT in the context of PEA.  
Key findings 
 Most recent literature on IWT acknowledges the importance of political economy issues 
such as the prevalence of governance failings in source countries. There is also a 
common recognition in much of the literature that political, economic, cultural and social 
factors drive both demand and supply sides of IWT, and that any effort to address the 
trade needs to be cognisant of these drivers.  
 However, it is very rare to find PEA tools or methods being used to analyse the drivers of 
the trade or to  shape policy recommendations or interventions. 
 Despite consensus in the literature that IWT involves complex networks between 
transnational crime syndicates, poachers, armed non-state actors, traders and 
consumers, this review found little evidence of attempts to map the links between these 
actors or to look in detail at their operating practices. This may be a consequence of the 
fact that the trade is clandestine and therefore empirical evidence is limited. 
 
                                                   
1
 Following a frequently-cited definition, this report uses the term ‘illegal wildlife trade’ to refer to the trade in animals and 
plants that have been poached, captured, collected or processed in contravention of national, regional or international 
laws (McLellan et al 2014). 
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 This report uses PEA to refer to “the interaction of political and economic processes in a society: the distribution of power 
and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these 
relationships over time” (DFID 2009). 
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2.  Political economy drivers of illegal wildlife trade 
The following underlying conditions have been identified as factors that enable IWT (WWF 2012). 
Although not explicitly identified as part of a PEA, these factors do refer to the way in which 
power, interests and incentives are structured, and the interaction between political and 
economic processes in societies. 
 As discussed in more detail below, poaching tends to thrive in places where there is 
widespread corruption, weak enforcement by government and limited economic 
opportunities.  
 Organised criminal groups are attracted to the availability of huge profits and the low-risk 
nature of wildlife crime, including the absence of credible law enforcement, prosecution, 
penalties and other deterrents.  
 Demand for illegal wildlife products has risen in step with economic growth in consumer 
countries, which is exacerbated by the increased accessibility of illegal wildlife products 
through the internet.  
 Internationally, blame for the issue is passed back and forth between source and 
consumer countries, and there is a lack of collaboration, coordination and accountability 
between them. 
Poverty and affluence   
A study by TRAFFIC (2008) explores the relative importance of poverty, livelihoods, resource 
management, awareness, legislation, and markets as possible drivers of IWT. The authors note 
that rising affluence and increasing disposable income in consumer countries are major drivers 
of demand for wildlife. They also note that a variety of factors associated with economic growth, 
trade expansion and the development of infrastructure are believed to be the primary drivers of 
the market availability of wildlife. The study notes, for example, the influence of the economic 
growth of India and China both in terms of their growing domination of regional markets and the 
changing demands, aspirations and purchasing power of increasingly affluent sectors of the 
population. A recent review of evidence looking at the trafficking of ivory and rhino horn also 
concluded that wealth rather than poverty was the ultimate driver, in that individuals from poor 
communities would not engage in the poaching of commercially valuable species unless there 
was demand from wealthier communities (Duffy and St John 2013). Analysis for the African 
Elephant Summit in December 2013 highlighted the interplay of poverty, weak governance and 
consumer demands as the strongest factors associated with the escalation of elephant poaching 
(CITES Secretariat et al. 2013). There is consensus across a number of studies that wealth in 
demand countries is a stronger driver of IWT than poverty in source countries (TRAFFIC 2008; 
IFAW 2008; Duffy 2010: 155-187; Duffy and St John 2013).  
Duffy (2016) argues that a fine-grained understanding of the political economy dynamics of 
poaching is required to understand the drivers of IWT. For example, it has been assumed that 
individuals engaged in rhino poaching in Kruger National Park in South Africa were recruited 
from economically deprived communities in Mozambique (Humphreys and Smith 2014: 802). 
However, the argument that poverty alone drives Mozambicans to poach in South Africa ignores 
the complex dynamics that encourage individuals to engage in illegal hunting. Duffy (2016) points 
out that the legislative framework in Mozambique has also contributed indirectly to poaching 
across the border in South Africa. Until recently, rhino-related offences were only considered as 
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misdemeanours rather than crimes under Mozambique’s legislative framework. Therefore if 
individuals were found to have rhino horn in their possession on their return to Mozambique, they 
would not face significant penalties. In addition, many of the communities on the Mozambican 
side of the border have a history of alienation from the parks, and they regard poaching as a form 
of resistance to their dispossession and exclusion from resources they once enjoyed (Duffy 
2016). 
Duffy (2016) also puts forward the example of pseudo-hunting in South Africa as an example 
which disrupts the neat categorisations of wealth and poverty as drivers of IWT, and illustrates 
the wider political economy dynamics at play. In 2013, one quarter of South Africa’s white rhinos 
were found on private conservation land. South Africa expanded the role of private reserves by 
creating financial incentives for stocking rhinos based on income generation from tourism, trophy 
hunting and live sales. This helped increase the country’s rhino population. However, between 
2007 and 2012, legally obtained sport hunting permits were used as a cover for the export of 
illegally hunted rhino horn (Emslie et al. 2012). This pseudo-hunting industry relied on collusion 
by ranch owners and veterinarians. As the value of live rhinos at legal auctions dropped, the 
illegal demand for rhino horn increased and the black market price rose. As a result, there was 
an economic incentive for ranch owners to ‘allow’ their rhinos to be poached, take a portion of the 
profits from the illegal sale of the horn and then buy another, cheaper live rhino via the Kwazulu-
Natal parks service auctions. South Africa’s Threatened or Protected Species Regulations 
created fear in emerging markets in Vietnam and Thailand that the supply of rhino horn would dry 
up as the state began to restrict access to hunting permits. This in turn prompted more 
aggressive poaching. In 2012, the South African state clamped down on pseudo hunting and 
banned sport hunting by Asian nationals However, by 2013 there had been a significant increase 
in permits given to Czech nationals, who were being used in place of Asian nationals to obtain 
rhino horn (CITES 2013, p. 6). 
3. Governance, corruption and political interference 
Countries that experience high levels of IWT are often characterised by poor governance and 
corruption (Biggs et al 2016; Weru 2016). Conversely, the most successful reformer countries 
with respect to wildlife governance have been Southern African nations that exhibit low levels of 
overall institutional corruption: Namibia, Botswana and South Africa (Nelson 2009). In these 
countries the overall governance context reduces the opportunities for public officials to privately 
capture and control the economic value of natural resources such as wildlife (Ibid). Elite capture 
(where resources designated for benefit of the larger population are claimed by a few individuals 
in privileged positions) at village through to national levels is widely recognised as a political 
economy challenge facing community-based conservation and community-based interventions 
against IWT (Biggs et al 2016).  
There is evidence in the literature that efforts to curb wildlife crime can be hindered by political 
interference. For example, according to a recent peer-reviewed article by Kideghesho (2016), 
Tanzanian politicians have been known to frustrate interventions targeted at IWT in order to 
protect the interests of their constituents who earn a living through the trade. The author also 
claims that in a survey of staff working in Tanzania’s national parks, 75% of respondents 
described local politicians as a constraint to conservation efforts. Evidence of political 
interference in the war against wildlife crime in Tanzania has also been reported in an inquiry 
conducted by the Parliamentary Committee on Land, Environment and Natural Resources, which 
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found some members of parliament and government officials guilty of protecting poachers with 
whom they had close personal ties (Ibid).    
4. Transnational criminal networks and IWT 
Wildlife crime has historically been seen and treated as a low-level offence, primarily carried out 
in an ad-hoc manner by subsistence hunters and the occasional small player looking for 
supplemental income. However, numerous sources have reported the increasing involvement of 
transnational organised crime networks in illegally sourcing and trading wildlife (Bennett 2011; 
Felbab-Brown 2011). The involvement of organised criminals in the illegal ivory trade, for 
example, is evidenced by the increasing trend in seizures of large-scale ivory shipments between 
Africa and Asia (Milliken et al 2012). Consumer demand for illegal wildlife goods and the 
prevalence of unregulated or insufficiently supervised markets have opened up opportunities for 
large profits by these networks. 
Moving large quantities of illegal wildlife products across international borders requires 
substantial resources, organisation and financial means for funding operations and logistics. The 
illegal trade in elephant tusks from Africa into Asia, for example, is reported to involve 
interlocking webs of shell companies, Southeast Asian and African nationals, and a smuggling 
route that runs from Africa across multiple borders and through several Asian ports before 
reaching its final destination (Banks et al 2007).  
The literature often outlines the structure of the criminal networks involved in IWT in broad terms. 
For example, a 2016 report from TRAFFIC (Weru 2016) states that poaching networks typically 
follow roughly the same pattern: a middleman connects the poacher to a local transporter who 
delivers the wildlife contraband to another middleman for onward delivery to a trafficking kingpin 
or patron. The kingpin finances the poaching network and uses corrupt connections in the public 
and private sector to move the contraband across county and country borders.   
However, whilst it is commonly stated in the literature that IWT often involves highly complex 
transnational networks of actors and a diverse range of social, political and economic drivers, it is 
rare to find any case studies that look at these networks and drivers in detail. The following sub-
sections discuss three exceptions, which include a study on elephant poaching in Tanzania, 
illegal ivory seized in Singapore, and illegal abalone farming in South Africa.   
Case study 1: Elephant poaching in Tanzania 
According to data from the Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS), East Africa is the biggest 
source region of illegal ivory, especially Kenya and Tanzania (EIA 2014). Tanzania’s elephants 
continue to be poached to supply the growing demand in an unregulated illegal ivory market, 
predominantly in China. Seizure data implicates Tanzania in more large flows of ivory than any 
other country. It is also consistently linked to criminal cases featuring exceptionally large 
consignments of ivory recovered in places as diverse as Hong Kong, Vietnam, the Philippines, 
Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Taiwan (Ibid).  
The poaching crisis in Tanzania involves a complex mix of criminal syndicates, often led by 
Chinese nationals, and corruption among some Tanzanian government officials. Collusion 
between corrupt officials and criminal enterprises explains the unprecedented scale of poaching 
and ivory smuggling in the country (Ibid). It also compromises enforcement efforts so that few of 
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the main culprits are prosecuted. Corruption is a key enabling factor at every stage of the ivory 
trafficking chain: from game rangers who provide information on patrol patterns and the location 
of elephant herds, to police officers who rent out weapons and transport ivory, to the Tanzanian 
Revenue Authority (TRA) officers who allow shipping containers of ivory to flow out of the 
country’s ports (Ibid).  
At the upper levels, politicians from the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party and well-
connected business people use their influence to protect the ivory traffickers. The former Minister 
for Natural Resources and Tourism, Khamis Kagasheki, in 2013 named four CCM members of 
parliament for their involvement in elephant poaching. He also alluded to the involvement of other 
high-level individuals, stating: “This business involves rich people and politicians who have 
formed a very sophisticated network” (Ibid). In 2008, police searched a truck in southern 
Tanzania and found a haul of ivory tusks. The vehicle was owned by Usangu Safaris, a hunting 
company owned by the family of Nawab Mulla, CCM Chairman for the Mbeya region. In 2013, 
CCM Secretary-General Abdulrahman Kinana was named in Parliament as being involved in the 
smuggling of ivory tusks from Tanzania to Vietnam in 2009, due to his ownership of one of the 
shipping companies involved in transporting the consignment (Ibid).  
China is the world’s largest destination market for illegal ivory. The current surge in illegal ivory 
trading in China is a consequence of several connected factors: the creation of a parallel legal 
domestic market for ivory in China by CITES
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 decisions; the role of the Chinese government and 
industry in stimulating demand for ivory products; and failure to stop the flow of smuggled ivory 
through Hong Kong to mainland China. Investigations in China highlight the role of the 
government in the trade, particularly state-owned ivory carving factories and stores (EIA 2014).  
Case study 2:  Illegal ivory seizure in Singapore    
In June 2002, over six tonnes of ivory was seized on board a ship arriving in Singapore. The 
seizure, which disrupted one of the world's most lucrative ivory syndicates, resulted from the 
coordinated efforts of national enforcement agencies from Zambia, Malawi and Singapore, and 
the multilateral Lusaka Agreement Task Force (Banks et al 2007). Investigations into the 
Singapore case revealed a well established syndicate comprised of Southeast Asian and African 
nationals operating across at least five borders and spanning two continents.  
Much of the ivory procured by the Singapore syndicate came from Zambia's South Luangwa 
National Park (SLNP). A poacher apprehended in SLNP in 2001 revealed that he had been 
contracted by the warden of the park to poach 100 elephants in order to supply ivory to the 
Singapore syndicate. Rather than being investigated, the warden was simply transferred to 
another region (Ibid).  
Recovered documentation showed that the syndicate had been active for at least eight years, 
having dispatched 19 similar sized shipments since 1994. This record of activity represents 
thousands of poached elephants and black market ivory worth hundreds of millions of dollars 
(Ibid). Sourced largely from elephants in Zambia, the ivory was transported to Malawi for packing 
before being taken by road to Mozambique. From there it was shipped to South Africa, and on to 
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Japan via Singapore. The modus operandi employed to avoid detection included the use of 
personal and company pseudonyms, mis-declaring goods, bribing customs officials, fake 
documentation and multiple shipments (Banks et al 2007).   
Case study 3: Illegal abalone fishing in South Africa 
Abalone poaching in South Africa has historically been most common in impoverished fishing 
communities. A range of organised criminal groups operate higher up in the illicit abalone 
economy, forming a chain that ultimately links divers with consumers in East Asia. At the start of 
the decade, illegal abalone poaching in South Africa emerged on a far bigger scale than ever 
before. De Greef and Raemaekers (2014) (citing Steinberg 2005) attribute this shift to four main 
factors, which illustrate some of the wider political economy dynamics involved.  
First, the South African rand depreciated in value, benefitting both legal and illegal local abalone 
exporters, who were able to earn proportionally more for their product. At the same time, rapid 
economic growth in East Asia boosted demand, causing prices for abalone and other high‐end 
goods to rise. This made abalone an exceptionally valuable resource, and one that was both 
abundant and highly accessible.  
Secondly, a sophisticated network of ethnic Chinese criminal syndicates, with connections to 
mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, and which had already been operating in South Africa 
for over a decade, played a key role in organising the illegal trade when the value of abalone 
increased. Links were forged with key actors in the Cape Town underworld. In exchange for 
abalone, the criminal gangs began bartering ingredients for the manufacture of illegal drugs that 
were popular among poorer residents of the Western Cape, tightly entwining illegal fishing with 
the broader criminal economy. 
The third main factor driving the explosion of organised abalone poaching in South Africa was 
the lifting of economic sanctions after the end of the country’s apartheid era. South Africa’s re‐
integration into the global economy and the concomitant rise in legal cross‐border trade made it 
easier for transnational criminal groups to conduct their operations without being detected; a 
situation exacerbated by slackened border controls making it easier for contraband to leave the 
country.  
The final factor identified by Steinberg (2005) is the widespread frustration felt by residents of 
South African fishing communities at slow fisheries reform. With the end of apartheid in 1994 
came widespread optimism that South African fisheries would reform for the benefit of the poor. 
But the transformation process that began shortly afterwards proved cumbersome. As a 
consequence, the expectations of many formerly disadvantaged fishers were not met, leaving a 
void for criminal groups to exploit.  
The upshot of these developments was that by the end of the 1990s abalone poaching in South 
Africa had ceased to be an informal, opportunistic activity and had entered the realm of large‐
scale, highly organised transnational crime. 
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5. Responses to IWT informed by political economy 
This review did not find any literature that explicitly uses or recommends PEA tools to inform 
policy responses to IWT. However, the following four themes have emerged, which are all 
informed by an appreciation of the importance of political and economic processes in society and 
the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals.  
Look beyond regulations. Historically, responses to IWT have been predominantly regulatory, 
involving the introduction of new and stronger legislation, the establishment of trade controls and 
sanctions, and the use of diplomatic pressure. But with rising demand for high-value species 
there is increasing recognition of the need for more multifaceted interventions. Going beyond 
stronger law enforcement and judicial procedures, these encompass engagement with local 
communities and support for sustainable livelihoods in wildlife source areas (Challender et al 
2014).  
Address governance failings. Most authors display an appreciation of the fact that laws and 
regulations stand little chance of success unless wider issues of governance are also tackled. 
The majority of wildlife products in trade are subject to one or more regulatory controls, but the 
success of regulatory interventions is highly variable. Low capacity and will to enforce controls on 
the wildlife trade, which in turn are underpinned by a range of factors associated with weak 
governance (such as corruption, breakdown of the rule of law and inadequate political will), are 
regarded as important reasons why IWT interventions fail in practice (TRAFFIC 2008).  
Respond to the economic and market drivers. As noted above, there is a general consensus 
that wealth is a stronger driver of IWT than poverty. Therefore IWT interventions that focus on 
reducing poverty alone are unlikely to be effective. There is a critical need to ensure that 
interventions are better targeted to respond to the dynamics of increasing affluence and wealth, 
rising aspirations and demands, and wider processes of economic growth. Particular efforts need 
to be made to target interventions to urban consumers, and to richer and more powerful groups 
(TRAFFIC 2008). Challender et al (2014) add that reducing consumer demand is required, which 
calls for an intensive research effort into consumer preferences, beliefs, social norms, and 
lifestyles to inform and develop the most appropriate interventions.  
Experiment with decentralisation. According to a brief by Nelson (2009), reforms that 
decentralise or devolve user rights over wildlife can radically change the attitudes of landholders 
towards wildlife, shifting incentives away from illegal practices and towards conservation and 
investment. In parts of Southern Africa, these kinds of reforms have led to wildlife recoveries and 
dramatic increases in wildlife‐based industries. But such reforms are often incompatible with the 
private interests and motivations of influential political elites and policy-makers. Devolving rights 
over wildlife to local actors constitutes a shift in control over wildlife’s economic value, which 
involves losing direct access to money and resources. These political‐economic factors can 
create strong incentives for policy‐makers to resist such reforms. This has been a central 
dynamic in the wildlife sector governance in wildlife‐rich countries including Tanzania, Zambia 
and Mozambique (Ibid). 
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